Thank you, Brian, for the introduction. It is a pleasure to be here today.[1]
Most of you probably have a smartphone within arm’s reach. At this very moment, some of you may be scrolling through it. First, that’s alright – I recognize that you are busy, multitasking people. Second, and more importantly for my remarks, is the fact that inside that mobile phone are tiny components made with tantalum. If you follow that tantalum backward, you will likely find that it passed through a retailer, a distributor, an assembler, a component maker, a subcomponent maker, an exporter, a trader, and a smelter. At the very end, there might be a miner in eastern Congo, digging out that tantalum by hand. In 2010, Congress tried to use that supply chain to bring peace and human dignity to that region. In 2026, we should talk about what happened instead.
The intentions were noble and bipartisan. The idea began as a bill from Senators Sam Brownback, Dick Durbin, and Russ Feingold.[2] It was incorporated as Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which directed the Commission to require companies to disclose whether any “conflict minerals,” specifically tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold,[3] in their products came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or its adjoining countries. Congress expressed its view that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals from the DRC was helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern DRC and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation.[4] This situation, thus, warranted adding the conflict minerals disclosure obligations to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.[5]
The theory was that transparency would starve armed groups of revenue. The statute requires annual reports filed with the SEC to include “a description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured that are not DRC conflict free.”[6] The law, and the subsequent SEC rules implementing that provision, asked companies, in effect, to tell the public whether their products might be connected to armed violence. Or, as the D.C. Circuit later described, these obligations were “compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands.”[7] Faced with that stigma, many chose the simplest path: stay away from the region.
Companies moved even before the SEC’s rule was final. In April 2011, after an electronics industry coalition advised smelters to stop accepting unverified minerals from central Africa, the major buyers of eastern Congolese tin withdrew, and exports reportedly fell by about 90 percent. Tens of thousands of individuals, and some estimate far more, lost their livelihoods. The exporters who remained turned around and sold primarily to Chinese buyers.[8] An SEC disclosure rule had resulted in a de facto embargo. However, that embargo did not end the demand for these critical minerals; it only changed who the buyers were.
Indeed, the very people that the law meant to help instead paid the price. A 2023 study found that the law reduced employment at tin, tantalum, and tungsten mines, and that the loss of mining income may have pushed some miners toward armed groups.[9] Moreover, the level of violence did not fall. Using data through 2022, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the rule was associated with a spread of violence, particularly around gold mines.[10] In other words, the embargo did not starve the armed groups. It moved them, and it left the miners and their families worse off.
The rule has also not delivered on the transparency it promised. The GAO found that nearly every filer surveys its suppliers, yet an estimated 62 percent of companies that performed due diligence still could not determine whether their minerals came from the DRC region.[11] That is not for a lack of effort. The obstacles are smuggling, fraud, and supply chains many tiers deep, problems that more paperwork in Washington cannot reach. What did improve security was engagement. Conditions improved around some mines once they were industrialized, in part because operators protecting their investments brought security with them.[12]
That matters for national security. Tin, tantalum, and tungsten are all on the U.S. Geological Survey’s List of Critical Minerals.[13] When American companies step back, others step in, and Chinese firms have built commanding positions across the DRC’s mining sector.[14] For years, administrations of both parties have recognized that secure supplies of critical minerals depend on American engagement abroad, not withdrawal. Yet a securities disclosure rule stemming from a 2010 law still tells American companies that sourcing minerals from the DRC region is a reputational risk.
So where does this leave us? Section 1502 remains a statutory mandate, but its implementation has been complicated by litigation. In 2015, the D.C. Circuit held that portions of the SEC’s implementing rule violated the First Amendment,[15] and the district court remanded the matter to the agency in 2017.[16] Yet, statements from 2017 by the staff[17] and then-Acting Chairman Michael Piwowar[18] in reaction to the decisions remain the last notable actions by the SEC.
After more than a decade and a half of experience, the evidence is in. In its report, the GAO concluded that peace and security in the DRC have not improved under the rule.[19] Given the current situation, there are options, ranging from repeal of the legislation to the statute’s own national security waiver,[20] to move away from the unconstructive financial disclosure approach set forth in Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and toward more productive efforts to address the humanitarian goals that inspired the original bill.
Securities disclosure is a powerful tool. It works best when it gives investors financially material information to make investment decisions. However, the federal securities laws were never designed to address conflict in central Africa.
I am one of only two SEC commissioners who have visited Africa this century. Commissioner Piwowar visited Rwanda,[21] and I visited Angola, and both are DRC-adjacent countries. I strongly believe in the future of the continent, including peace, security, and economic prosperity. However, ending conflict and securing critical minerals are primarily the work of diplomacy, development, and economic policy. When we ask securities disclosure to do that work, we risk getting neither good disclosure nor the positive results on the ground in Africa that we seek. Thank you.
[1] My remarks reflect my individual views as a Commissioner and not necessarily those of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.
[3] Technically, the statute applied to the ores and their derivatives used for these metals, which were columbite-tantalite or coltan (tantalum), cassiterite (tin), and wolframite (tungsten), as well as gold. See Section 1502(e)(4) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
[4] See Section 1502(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
[6] 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii).
[7] Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on reh’g, Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
[8] The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America and the Congo: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Monetary Pol’y & Trade of the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2012), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg75730/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg75730.pdf; Laura E. Seay, What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy, Ctr. For Global Dev. Working Paper 284 (Jan. 2012) available at https://www.cgdev.org/publication/what%E2%80%99s-wrong-dodd-frank-1502-conflict-minerals-civilian-livelihoods-and-unintended.
[9] Jeffrey R. Bloem, Good Intentions Gone Bad? The Dodd-Frank Act and Conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 71, no. 2 (Chicago: Jan. 2023).
[10] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-25-107018, Conflict Minerals: Peace and Security in Democratic Republic of Congo Have Not Improved with SEC Disclosure Rule (Oct. 2024), available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107018 (“GAO Report”).
[15] Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. V. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
[16] Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C., No. 1:13-CV-00635-KBJ, 2017 WL 3503370, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2017).
[19] GAO Report, supra note 10.